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I Introduction: current situation 
In the UK, blasphemy and blasphemous libel were common law offences,1 which meant that 
they were not laid down in statute, but were grounded in case law. The offences were 
officially abolished for England and Wales in May 2008, by Section 79 of the Criminal 
Justice and Immigration Act 2008. In Scotland and Northern Ireland, the offences still exist, 
although the last prosecution for blasphemy in Scotland was in 1843 and there have never 
been any prosecutions in Northern Ireland. 
In 2006, the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 was adopted and this Act added a 
new Part 3A to the Public Order Act 1986, entitled ‘Hatred against persons on religious 
grounds’, adding Sections 29A to 29N to the 1986 Act. The first section, Section 29A, 
defines ‘religious hatred’ as meaning ‘hatred against a group of persons defined by reference 
to religious belief or lack of religious belief’. The Public Order Act 1986 already contained 
provisions against racial hatred, which are different from those against religious hatred.  
                                                 
 
1 Blasphemous libel is the written form of blasphemy. See Law Commission, Offences against Religion and 
Public Worship (LAW COM. No 145), 18 June 1985, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/235882/0442.pdf , para. 2.1. 
  
There are also provisions on racially and religiously aggravated offences. The former 
were laid down in Sections 28 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, which was amended in 
December 2001, after the events on 11 September 2001, to include offence committed on 
religious grounds. Section 28(5) determines that ‘in this section “religious group” means a 
group of persons defined by reference to religious belief or lack of religious belief’. This 
means that, if there is religious hostility, the courts can impose a penalty above the ordinary 
maximum for the offence. 
In this chapter, these provisions and the history that led to the abolition of blasphemy 
and blasphemous libel and to the enactment of the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 will 
be examined. But what is the difference between blasphemy and religious hatred? Leigh 
writes that ‘the essence of blasphemy is showing contempt or insult to God or anything 
considered sacred’.2 He distinguishes this from religious insult, which focuses on insulting 
those who belong to a specific religion or their religious feelings and from religious hatred, 
which ‘is a stronger form of conduct that may or may not be accompanied by intention to 
promote discrimination or violence against members of a religion’.3 So, as Leigh sums up, ‘in 
principle blasphemy protects religious ideas per se whereas religious insults and religious 
hatred protect the persons holding religious beliefs’.4 With this in mind, the different 
provisions in the UK are analysed. 
II Blasphemy: status of the offence before abolition 
Blasphemy (and blasphemous libel) was a common law offence going back many centuries.5 
In 2002, a House of Lords Select Committee was asked to consider and report on the law 
relating to religious offences. This Committee examined whether the existing religious 
offences (notably blasphemy) should be amended or abolished and whether a new offence of 
incitement to religious hatred should be created and, if so, how such an offence should be 
defined.6 The report discussed the offence of blasphemy and stated that this offence was 
                                                 
 
2 Ian Leigh, ‘Damned if they do, damned if they don’t: the European Court of Human Rights and the protection 
of religion from attack’ (2011) 17:1 Res Publica 57. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid.  
5 For the history of the offence, see the Chapter by Mark Hill and Russell Sandberg in this volume. 
6 See the report Select Committee on Religious Offences in England and Wales, Session 2002-03, HL Paper 95-
I, 5. 
  
based on the idea that faith influenced society’s political and moral behaviour and thus that 
challenges to that faith were serious threats to the fabric of society and had to be punished 
severely.7 In other words, blasphemy was seen as ‘akin to treason’.8  
From 1838, the law of blasphemy only protected the beliefs of the Church of 
England.9 Other Christian denominations appeared to be protected insofar as their beliefs 
overlapped with those of the Church of England.10 Moreover, the law only prohibited 
material which was couched in indecent or offensive terms which was clear from Bowman, 
where the House of Lords confirmed that blasphemy required intemperate or scurrilous 
language.11 Therefore, reasonable criticism was not considered blasphemous12 and ‘if the 
decencies of controversy are observed, even the fundamentals of religion might be 
attacked’.13 
The offence of blasphemy was a so-called ‘strict liability’ offence: it did not require 
proof of intent to blaspheme, only proof of intent to publish. So it was sufficient for the 
prosecution to prove that the publication had been intentional and that the matter published 
was blasphemous. This was confirmed by the House of Lords in R v. Lemon, R v. Gay 
News,14 a case which will be discussed in more detail below (see this section). 
 There were only four reported judgments in the twentieth century and no blasphemy 
case was prosecuted in England and Wales following the passage of the Human Rights Act 
1998.15 This Act incorporated the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR) into domestic law. Since the coming into force of this Act in October 
2000, the rights laid down in the ECHR can be invoked directly in the domestic courts.  
                                                 
 
7 Ibid., 46. See also R v. Taylor (1676) 1 Vent 293. 
8 Russell Sandberg and Norman Doe, ‘The strange death of blasphemy’ (2008) 71:6 Modern Law Review 972. 
9 Gathercole’s Case (1838) 2 Lewin 237. 
10 Williams (1797) 26 St Tr 654. See also Mark Hill and Russell Sandberg, ‘Blasphemy and Human Rights: An 
English Experience in a European Court’, (2009) IV Derecho y Religion 145-160, 148 and the chapter by the 
same authors in this volume, where the authors mention that judicial pronouncements on this were becoming 
increasingly contradictory. 
11 Bowman v. Secular Society Ltd [1917] AC 406. 
12Sandberg and Doe, ‘The strange death of blasphemy’ 972. See also House of Lords Select Committee, 47, 
para. 6. 
13 R v. Ramsay and Foote (1883) 15 Cox CC 231, as cited in Sandberg and Doe, ‘The strange death of 
Blasphemy’ 973. 
14 R v. Lemon, R v. Gay News Ltd [1979] AC 617. 
15 House of Lords Select Committee, 46, para. 3. 
  
The first of these four cases, Bowman, confirmed, as already mentioned, previous case 
law, while, in 1922, R v. Gott was the last case that led to a person being imprisoned for 
blasphemy.16 Between 1922 and 1977, there were no prosecutions, although the offence was 
‘policed extra-legally; it was curtailed by the fears, anxieties and sensitivities of individuals 
rather than by law’.17 
In 1977, a private prosecution was brought against both the editor and the publishers 
of the journal ‘Gay News’ concerning a publication of a poem entitled ‘The love that dares to 
speak its name’ which described sexual acts between Christ and his disciples and other 
persons and with Christ’s body immediately after his death.18 Both editor and publishers were 
convicted of blasphemous libel. The House of Lords confirmed, as mentioned, that intent to 
publish is necessary for the offence, but that it is not necessary to prove intent to blaspheme. 
In relation to human rights as guaranteed by the ECHR, Lord Scarman considered that Article 
9 ECHR (guaranteeing the freedom of religion as well as the freedom to manifests one’s 
religion) by necessary implication ‘imposes a duty on all of us to refrain from insulting or 
outraging the religious feelings of others’. In relation to Article 10 (guaranteeing freedom of 
expression) he mentioned that the exercise of this freedom carries with it duties and 
responsibilities and may be subject to restrictions. His conclusion was that ‘it would be 
intolerable if by allowing an author or publisher to plead the excellence of his motives and 
the right of free speech he could evade the penalties of the law even though his words were 
blasphemous in the sense of constituting an outrage upon the religious feelings of his fellow 
citizens’.19 This suggests that the law of blasphemy was held to be compatible with the 
ECHR. 
This was confirmed when the case went to Strasbourg. In Gay News v. the United 
Kingdom,20 the European Commission of Human Rights held that the application was 
manifestly ill-founded and declared the application inadmissible. The Commission held that 
the restriction on the freedom of expression in order to protect religious feelings was justified 
                                                 
 
16 R v. Gott (1922) 16 CR App R 87. 
17 Sandberg and Doe, ‘The strange death of blasphemy’ 974. See also the Chapter by Hill and Sandberg in this 
volume. 
18 R v. Lemon, R v. Gay News Ltd [1979] AC 617. 
19 Ibid., 664. 
20 Gay News v the United Kingdom, App. No. 8710/79 (1983) 5 EHRR 123. 
  
under Article 10(2) ECHR.21 The complaint of a violation of Article 9 ECHR was rejected on 
the same grounds, while the claim under Article 14 (guaranteeing non-discrimination in the 
enjoyment of the rights and freedoms in the ECHR) was dismissed because ‘there is no 
evidence that the applicants were discriminated against on account of their homosexual views 
or of beliefs not shared by confessing Christians’.22 The Commission also held that ‘the 
applicants cannot complain of discrimination because the law of blasphemy protects only the 
Christian but no other religion. This distinction in fact relates to the object of legal protection, 
but not to the personal status of the offender’.23 
Since the Gay News case, there have not been any successful prosecutions for 
blasphemy or blasphemous libel. In 1989, Salman Rushdie’s book ‘The Satanic Verses’ was 
published and the publication led to protests by British Muslims, who tried to bring a private 
prosecution against the author for blasphemy. But this was refused on the grounds that the 
offence only protects the Christian religion and there was no justification for a court to extend 
this, as this was a question for Parliament to decide. It was also mentioned that the fact that 
blasphemy did not apply to Islam did not mean that the UK was in breach of its 
responsibilities under the ECHR.24 An application to the European Court of Human Rights 
for a violation of Article 9 and 14 was declared inadmissible because ‘no State authority, or 
any body for which the United Kingdom Government may be responsible under the 
Convention, directly interfered in the applicant’s freedom to manifest his religion or belief’.25 
Although, in the Gay News case, the prosecution for blasphemy was successful, when 
the poem was recited publicly in 2002 to celebrate the 25th anniversary of its first appearance 
there was no action taken by the authorities.26 Garcia Oliva writes that this made the fragility 
of the blasphemy offence obvious.27 
Wingrove v. the United Kingdom was another challenge to the law of blasphemy 
before the European Court of Human Rights,28 although this case did not concern a 
                                                 
 
21 Ibid, paras 2 and 12.  
22 Ibid, para. 4. 
23 Ibid, para. 14. 
24 R v Chief Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Choudhury [1991] 1QB 429. 
25 Choudbury v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 17439/90 (1991) 12 HRLJ 172.  
26 See also: Hill and Sandberg, in this volume. 
27 Javier. Garcia Oliva, ‘The legal protection of believers and beliefs in the United Kingdom’, (2007) 9:1 
Ecclesiastical Law Journal 72. 
28 Wingrove v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 17419/90 (1997) 24 EHRR 1. 
  
prosecution for blasphemy but rather a refusal by the British Board of Film Classification to 
issue a classification certificate for the video film ‘Visions of Ecstasy’ because it might well 
be regarded as blasphemous. The film was based on the writings of Saint Teresa de Avila, 
who had experienced powerful ecstatic visions of Jesus Christ. The maker of the film 
complained of a violation of his right to freedom of expression but the European Court of 
Human Rights concluded that Article 10 was not violated. The refusal was intended to protect 
the right of citizens not to be insulted in their religious feelings and, it was proportionate to 
that aim. So, the blasphemy law was compliant with the ECHR.29 
In 2005, the BBC transmission of ‘Jerry Springer: the Opera’ led to a large number of 
complaints, both before and after transmission. An attempt was made to bring a private 
prosecution for blasphemous libel against both the producer and the BBC.30 The Magistrate’s 
Court refused to issue a summons and the claimant applied to the High Court for judicial 
review of this decision. The High Court considered that ‘it is apparent from the Claimant’s 
own description of this work, confirmed by our own brief viewing of a recording of it, that its 
target is the tasteless “confessional” chat show, rather than the Christian religion’.31 The 
Court then mentioned that the offence of blasphemy still existed and that the elements of the 
offence were, first, it must concern material that was contemptuous, reviling, scurrilous 
and/or ludicrous; second, the publication must endanger society or cause civil strife.32 The 
Court held that the second requirement is ‘consistent with the requirement in modern times 
that any such crime be compatible with Article 10(2) and considered (referring to Wingrove) 
that ‘whilst the law of blasphemy may well be “consonant” with the right to freedom of 
thought and to manifest one’s religion enshrined in Article 9 … the Article 10(2) basis for the 
crime of blasphemous libel is best found, as it seems to us, in the risk of disorder amongst, 
and damage to, the community generally’.33 
So, although there have been very few prosecutions in the twentieth century, Green 
suggested that the offence still existed. But had it become a dead letter? That is what Lord 
                                                 
 
29 See also Hill and Sandberg in this volume. 
30 See R (on the application of Stephen Green) v. the City of Westminster Magistrate’s Court [2007] EWHC 
2785. See on this case also Hill and Sandberg in this volume. 
31 Ibid., para. 8. 
32 Ibid., paras 10 and 11. 
33 Ibid., para. 17. 
  
Denning stated in 1949.34 The House of Lords Select Committee considered that ‘any 
prosecution for blasphemy today … is likely to fail on grounds either of discrimination or 
denial of the right to freedom of expression’,35 which also suggests that it was a dead letter. 
On the other hand, Sandberg and Doe write that ‘the Gay News case showed that the 
blasphemy laws remained very much alive’36 and that Green suggests that the offence ‘lay 
dormant rather than dead’.37 Garcia Oliva, in a case comment on Green, writes that ‘the 
requirements of the offence are so unlikely to be met that its abolition seems to be the most 
reasonable way forward’.38 So, what led to the abolition of the offence in 2008?  
III Background to abolition 
Section 79 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 abolished the offences of 
blasphemy and blasphemous libel for England and Wales. In Scotland and Northern Ireland, 
the offences still exist.  
In a report in 1985, the majority of the Law Commission recommended that the 
offence of blasphemy should be abolished without replacement,39 while the minority 
favoured abolition but with replacement by a new, statutory offence.40 The reasons given for 
abolishment were that the common law on blasphemy was uncertain to an unacceptable 
degree because the lack of clear definition of the offence; that it was undesirable to have a 
criminal offence of strict liability, where intent to publish but no intent to blaspheme was 
needed; and, ‘in the circumstances prevailing now in England and Wales, the limitation of the 
offence to the protection of Christianity and, it would seem, the tenets of the Church of 
England, cannot be justified’.41 
                                                 
 
34 Lord Alfred Denning, Freedom under law – Hamlyn Lecture (London: Stevens & Co, 1949), 46. 
35 House of Lords Select Committee, 48, para. 10. 
36 Sandberg and Doe, ‘The strange death of blasphemy’ 974. See also Hill and Sandberg in this volume. 
37 Sandberg and Doe, ‘The strange death of blasphemy’ 983. 
38 Javier Garcia Oliva, ‘Blasphemy and “Jerry Springer: the opera” – R. (on the application of Green) v City of 
Westminster Magistrates’ Court [2007] EWHC 2785 (Admin)’, (2008) 13:2 Communications Law 57. 
39 Law Commission, Offences against religion and public worship, para. 4.1. 
40 Ibid., Note of dissent, para. 1.1. 
41 Ibid., para. 2.18. 
  
In 1995, a Blasphemy Abolition Bill, proposed by Lord Avebury, was debated in the 
House of Lords, but this Bill never became law.42 In 2001, the then Home Secretary, David 
Blunkett, told the House of Commons, during the debates on the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and 
Security Bill, that the Government’s position was that ‘there is a good case for revising and, 
indeed, removing existing blasphemy law’ and that ‘there is no question of extending the 
blasphemy law to all other denominations and faiths’.43 The fact that blasphemy laws only 
covered the Church of England and Christian denominations was criticised severely at the 
time and the proposed Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Bill created an offence of religious 
hatred, but that part of the Act was not adopted.  
In 2002, the Religious Offences Bill aimed to ‘abolish the common law offence of 
blasphemy and certain other offences; and to create an offence of religious hatred’, as the Bill 
set out, but again, this Bill was not adopted.44 The earlier mentioned report of the House of 
Lords Select Committee on Religious Offences did not make any concrete recommendations 
about abolition and/or replacement, but the debates about this report in the House of Lords 
show that opinions as to whether the offence should be abolished were divided.45  
Finally, during the passage of the Racial and Religious Hatred Bill, abolition was 
again debated but this was voted down by the House of Lords.46 So abolition of the offence of 
blasphemy has been debated on a number of occasions but this did not lead to actual abolition 
until 2008.  
IV Developments contributing to abolition 
Sandberg and Doe distinguish five important developments that influenced the eventual 
abolition of the offences by the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008: the decision of 
the Supreme Court of Ireland that a prosecution for blasphemy could not succeed there; the 
work of the House of Lords Select Committee on Religious Offences in England and Wales; 
                                                 
 
42 See http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1995/jan/10/blasphemy-abolition-bill-hl and 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1995/feb/22/blasphemy-abolition-bill-hl.  
43 David Blunkett, HC Deb Column 707-708, 26 November 2001, available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmhansrd/vo011126/debtext/11126-17.htm#11126-
17_spnew5 For the Bill see: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmbills/049/2002049.pdf.  
44 Bill available at http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld200102/ldbills/039/2002039.pdf.  
45 See http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/2004/apr/22/religious-offences.  
46 HL Deb Column 523, 528, 532-533, 535, 8 November 2005, available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldhansrd/vo051108/text/51108-08.htm.  
  
the enactment of the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006; the Green case; and, the 
Parliamentary history leading to abolition of the offence.47 As these five developments 
clearly illustrate the forces behind abolition, they will be discussed here.  
A. Corway v. Independent Newspapers (Ireland) Ltd 
The first development was a decision of the Irish Supreme Court about the publication in a 
national newspaper of a cartoon concerning the influence of the Catholic Church in Ireland. 
According to the applicant, this cartoon treated the sacrament of the Eucharist and its 
administration as objects of scorn and derision.48 The Supreme Court held that a prosecution 
for blasphemy could not succeed in Ireland because, firstly, it was questionable whether 
Article 40 of the Irish Constitution, which determines that ‘the publication or utterance of 
blasphemous … matter is an offence which shall be punishable in accordance with law’, was 
compatible with the freedom of religion also guaranteed by the Constitution.49 Secondly, in 
English law the offence of blasphemy only protected the established Church, the Church of 
England, but the Church of Ireland had been disestablished in 1869 and thus the common law 
offence could not survive in such a different constitutional framework.50 The third reason was 
legal uncertainty: there was no definition of the offence.51  
Sandberg and Doe question all three arguments.52 According to them, the first and 
third arguments contradict the case law of the European Court of Human Rights that 
blasphemy laws do not breach Article 9 ECHR or the legal certainty requirements of Article 
7 ECHR. However, this ignores the fact that the Irish Supreme Court found that the offence 
was not compatible with the Irish Constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion. This 
guarantee might be interpreted differently from Article 9 ECHR. The second reason seems to 
Sandberg and Doe to be incorrect in law, because blasphemy protects not only the Church of 
England but also other Christian religions and the disestablishment of the Church of Ireland is 
thus as irrelevant as the disestablishment of the Church of Wales (in 1914).53 However, it was 
                                                 
 
47 Sandberg and Doe, ‘The strange death of blasphemy’ 976. 
48 Corway v. Independent Newspapers (Ireland) Ltd [1999] 4 IR 485. 
49 Ibid., para. 35 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid., para. 38. 
52 Sandberg and Doe, ‘The strange death of blasphemy’ 977-978. 
53 Ibid. 
  
already mentioned that Hill and Sandberg write that the case law was not clear as to whether 
the offence of blasphemy protected other Christian denominations or not.54  
Opinions about the compatibility of the laws of blasphemy with the ECHR are 
divided. Hare, for example, writes that the uncertainty and the breadth of the offence pose a 
serious threat to free speech.55 Goodall writes that, although the matter is not settled, the 
English law on blasphemy seems to be incompatible with the ECHR.56 And, Lester also 
appears to have understood the decision of the Irish Supreme Court in a very different way as 
he writes: ‘I believe that, if a suitable case were now to come before the courts, the UK Law 
Lords would overrule previous case law upholding the offence of blasphemy [referring to the 
Gay News case] and would find persuasive the Irish Supreme Court’s decision holding that 
blasphemous libel is so lacking in legal certainty that it is no longer an enforceable criminal 
offence’.57 So opinions are divided as to the compatibility of the English law of blasphemy 
with the ECHR and such laws certainly raise issues about freedom of religion and freedom of 
expression. We will come back to this in the next sections (see all sections below). 
B. House of Lords Select Committee on Religious Offences in England and Wales 
As mentioned, the 2003 report of the House of Lords Select Committee considered that ‘any 
prosecution for blasphemy today … is likely to fail on grounds either of discrimination or 
denial of the right to freedom of expression’.58 The Select Committee argued that the decision 
of the European Court of Human Rights in Wingrove v the United Kingdom ‘that there was 
not yet “sufficient common accord” to mean that the English law of blasphemy was in breach 
of the European Convention does not mean that it will not rule otherwise in the future’.59  
Sandberg and Doe point out that this contention would, if taken to its logical 
conclusion, call into question every decision by the European Court of Human Rights, 
although they do admit that the Convention is a living instrument and that its interpretation 
                                                 
 
54 See chapter by Hill and Sandberg in this volume. 
55 Ivan Hare, ‘Blasphemy and incitement to religious hatred: free speech dogma and doctrine’, in Ivan Hare and 
James Weinstein (eds.), Extreme speech and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 302. 
56 Kay Goodall, ‘Incitement to religious hatred: all talk and no substance?’, (2007) 70:1 Modern Law Review 
(2007) 105 and 107. 
57 Anthony Lester, Free speech and religion – the eternal conflict in the age of selective modernization, 12 May 
2006, available at http://www.odysseustrust.org/lectures/274_Hungarytalk.pdf , 14-15. 
58 House of Lords Select Committee, 48, para. 10. 
59 Ibid., para. 12. 
  
can change over time.60 However, authors ignore the fact that the Wingrove v the United 
Kingdom decision of the European Court of Human Rights was taken in 1997, now nearly 20 
years ago, and that the decision that the law of blasphemy is compatible with the ECHR does 
not mean that signatory states must have such laws, nor that such laws are always compatible 
with the ECHR. Both the right to freedom of religion and the right to freedom of expression 
can be restricted when this is justified. To establish this, a balancing exercise takes place 
taking into account all the interests involved. This exercise is case-specific, so the European 
Court of Human Rights might come to a different conclusion in future cases.  
Moreover, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has stated that 
‘blasphemy laws should not be used to curtail freedom of expression and thought’ and that 
‘freedom of expression as protected under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights should not be further restricted to meet increasing sensitivities of certain religious 
groups’.61 The Assembly has also considered that blasphemy should not be a criminal 
offence;62 that blasphemy laws should be reviewed ‘in view of the greater diversity of 
religious beliefs in Europe and the democratic principle of the separation of state and 
religion’;63 and, that ‘national law should only penalise expressions about religious matters 
which intentionally and severely disturb public order and call for public violence’.64 All this 
suggests that, even within the Council of Europe, blasphemy laws are seen as raising serious 
issues in relation to freedom of religion and freedom of expression.  
The House of Lords Select Committee also stated that there are other problems with 
the common law offences: the disproportionality of an unlimited penalty; discrimination in 
favour of Christianity alone; and the fact that there is no mechanism to take account of the 
proper balance to be struck under Article 10 ECHR.65 Sandberg and Doe again criticise this 
as being contrary to case law from the European Court of Human Rights and from the 
English domestic courts.66 However, the Select Committee itself points out that there is a 
                                                 
 
60 Sandberg and Doe, ‘The strange death of blasphemy’ 979. 
61 Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Europe, Resolution 1510 (2006) Freedom of expression and respect for 
religious beliefs, paras 3 and 12. 
62 Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Europe, Recommendation 1805 (2007) Blasphemy, religious insults and 
hate speech against persons on grounds of their religion, para. 4. 
63 Ibid., para. 10. 
64 Ibid., para. 15. 
65 House of Lords Select Committee, 49, para. 15. 
66 Sandberg and Doe, ‘The strange death of blasphemy’ 979. 
  
difference between the domestic courts and the European Court of Human Rights in applying 
the ECHR because the domestic court cannot rely on the margin of appreciation.67 And, as 
pointed out above, opinions are divided about whether blasphemy offences are compatible 
with the ECHR. 
C. Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 
The third development which played a role on the road to the abolition of the blasphemy 
offence was the enactment of the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006. This is discussed in 
the part on alternative offences below (see section V). 
D. Jerry Springer: the opera 
The fourth development on the road to abolition of the offence of blasphemy is the High 
Court decision in Green concerning ‘Jerry Springer: the Opera’, discussed before, which 
made clear that the offence still existed and did not breach the ECHR.68 Sandberg and Doe 
argue that this undermines the reasoning of the Irish Supreme Court, the House of Lords 
Select Committee and the debates in the House of Lords that blasphemy laws would not be 
compatible with the ECHR.69 However, as mentioned above, there are also writers who do 
not agree that the blasphemy laws are compatible with the ECHR. Moreover, the fact that the 
compatibility with the rights to freedom of religion and freedom of expression was discussed 
by the Irish Supreme Court and in the debates in the House of Lords, also shows that there 
were a number of people who questioned this compatibility and that opinions were very much 
divided on this issue. 
A more cogent rationale for abolishing the offence was, according to Sandberg and 
Doe, provided in the Green case: Section 2(4) of the Theatres Act 1968 prevented 
prosecution. This section determines that ‘no person shall be proceeded against in respect of a 
performance of a play or anything said or done in the course of such a performance (a) for an 
offence at common law where it is of the essence of the offence that the performance or, as 
the case may be, what was said or done was obscene, indecent, offensive, disgusting or 
injurious to morality …’. The High Court held that this section was applicable to the offence 
                                                 
 
67 House of Lords Select Committee, 49, para. 15. 
68 R (on the application of Stephen Green) v the City of Westminster Magistrate’s Court [2007] EWHC 2785. 
69 Sandberg and Doe, ‘The strange death of blasphemy’ 981. Leigh makes the same point, see: Leigh, ‘Damned 
if they do, damned if they don’t’, 58-59. 
  
of blasphemy. And, although the Theatres Act 1968 does not apply to broadcasts, there are 
identical provisions in the Broadcasting Act 1990, as Sandberg and Doe point out.70 These 
authors express their surprise that the impact of the Theatres Act 1968 was previously 
ignored in the debate.71 
In contrast to this, Hare writes that the outcome of the Green case ‘is even more 
surprising when the provisions of the Theatres Act and the Broadcasting Act are examined in 
context’.72 He argues that both acts prohibit the performance of obscene plays and 
incorporate the test of a tendency to ‘deprave and corrupt’ from the Obscene Publications Act 
1959 and that, looking at the legislative history, no mention was made of blasphemy. The 
provision, on which the Court in Green relied, thus relate to the common law of obscenity 
and were not meant to have an impact on the law of blasphemy.73 Hare also finds it 
disappointing that the Court did not address the compatibility of the offence of blasphemy 
with the protection of free speech.74 So here, again, an author expresses that the blasphemy 
laws could very well be incompatible with the ECHR. 
Hare also writes that ‘the decision in Green is even more striking when one considers 
that the result of the decision cannot sensibly be confined to theatre and television’.75 He 
argues that, under both domestic and European Court of Human Rights case law, the state can 
subject broadcasting to more rigorous restrictions than printed matter and, thus, if the state 
has found that restrictions on blasphemy are not necessary for broadcasting, it will be even 
more difficult to argue that they are necessary for the printed word. And, as Hare concludes, 
the Green case is ‘likely to have swept away the law of blasphemy in all areas except for 
face-to-face utterances between individuals. The Divisional Court [High Court] had thus 
almost fully achieved what the House of Lords said in Lemon [Gay News] was not possible 
by judicial decision’.76 
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E. Abolition of blasphemy 
The response to Green was legislative action. The Parliamentary history of Article 79(1) of 
the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 is the fifth development which influenced the 
abolition of blasphemy. In January 2008, Dr Evan Harris moved a new clause to the Criminal 
Justice and Immigration Bill to abolish ‘the ancient discriminatory, unnecessary, illiberal and 
non-human rights compliant offences of blasphemy and blasphemous libel’.77 The offences 
were unnecessary, firstly, because there were enough laws dealing with public decency and 
public order offences to ensure that the abolition of the offences would not lead to 
widespread outrageous behaviour in public; and, secondly, ‘the Almighty does not need the 
protection of these ridiculous laws, which is why many people with a religious perspective 
share the view that these offences should be abolished’.78 Harris explained that the offence is 
illiberal because of its uncertain scope and because it is a strict liability offence, so it is no 
defence that one did not intend to blasphemy. Because of this, one cannot know when one is 
committing the offence.79 Furthermore, the penalty for the offence is unlimited and the 
offence is discriminatory because it only protects the Christian religion and the tenets of the 
Church of England. Because of this, the offence is incompatible with the ECHR and with 
British law, now it incorporates the Convention, according to Harris.80 Later on in the debate, 
Harris pointed out that:  
the offence is also divisive in terms of social cohesion, partly because it is 
discriminatory. The corollary of that is that it raises a sense of unfairness among 
other religions, particularly those whose adherents are more sensitive than adherents 
to the Christian faith—a sense that they are being singled out because they are not 
protected. It raises the expectation, which previous Governments may have sought to 
keep going, that they will be entitled to their own—Islamic, say—version of a 
blasphemy law. The best way in which to make clear to the communities and people 
of this nation that we do not expect there to be protection of beliefs, or indeed of 
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people’s sensibilities about their beliefs, is to abolish the existing blasphemy 
offences, and that is one of the strongest arguments for so doing.81 
Harris mentioned two more reasons for abolishing the offences: that the law on blasphemy 
has a ‘chilling effect’ because it could mean that people might avoid showing, publishing or 
printing material that might be blasphemous because they might be subject to criminal 
sanctions.82 The final reason for proposing abolition was ‘its impact on our ability to conduct 
our affairs in terms of international human rights and international relations, and to criticise 
other countries’ uses of their blasphemy laws’.83 
The Government agreed that it was time for Parliament to act because the offences 
had largely fallen into desuetude and appeared to be moribund.84 However, they found it 
necessary to consult the Anglican Church and assured that this would be done quickly and 
that then the Government would bring forward proposals to abolish the blasphemy offences. 
Harris then withdrew his proposal.85 
On 5 March 2008, an amendment to the Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill 
abolishing blasphemy was moved by the Government in the House of Lords. A number of 
reasons were given: ‘first, the law has fallen into disuse and therefore runs the risk of 
bringing the law as a whole into disrepute. Secondly, we now have new legislation to protect 
individuals on the grounds of religion and belief’.86 Third, ‘it is crystal clear that the offences 
of blasphemy and blasphemous libel are unworkable in today’s society because they do not 
protect the individual or groups of people, they do not protect our fundamental rights—
indeed, they may conflict with them—and they do not protect the sacred’.87 And, the fourth 
reason echoed what was said by Harris, that the UK could not challenge oppressive 
blasphemy laws in other countries as long as the law remained on the statute book.88 
The Joint Committee on Human Rights reported on the Bill and came to the 
conclusion that continuing to have offences of blasphemy and blasphemous libel could no 
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longer be justified. The Committee also said that it was confident that the English Courts 
under the Human Rights Act and the European Court of Human Rights under the ECHR 
would come to the same conclusion.89 The amendment was passed by 148 votes to 87 in the 
House of Lords90 and then by 378 votes to 57 in the House of Commons.91 The Act came into 
force on 8 July 2008. 
V Alternative offences 
As mentioned, one of the reasons given by the Government to abolish the blasphemy 
offences was that there was new legislation to protect individuals on the grounds of religion 
and belief. They were referring to the protection against discrimination and harassment on the 
ground of religion or belief under the Employment Equality (Religion and Belief) 
Regulations 200392 and to the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006, which, as its Section 1 
says, ‘creates offences involving stirring up hatred against persons on religious grounds’. The 
Regulations did not create any criminal offences. The Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 
added a new part 3A to the Public Order Act 1986. This part has the title ‘Hatred against 
persons on religious grounds’ and contains Sections 29A to 29N. The definition of ‘religious 
hatred’ can be found in Section 29A: ‘hatred against a group of persons defined by reference 
to religious belief or lack of religious belief’. 
In the House of Lords debates on the proposal for abolition of the blasphemy 
offences, it was pointed out that, contrary to the offences of blasphemy and blasphemous 
libel, which do not protect individuals or groups from harm, the offence of incitement to 
religious hatred do provide this protection.93 Moreover, whereas blasphemy only protects 
Christianity and the Church of England, those of other faiths and those of no faith are both 
protected by the new incitement provisions and, ‘this legislation recognises a more complex 
and diverse society, which respects those of faith and those of none’.94  
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Part 3 of the Public Order Act 1986 already contained offences against stirring up 
racial hatred. Two previous Bills, the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill in 200195 and 
the Serious Organised Crime and Police Bill in 2004-2005,96 had attempted to extend the 
existing offence of racial hatred to include religious hatred, but neither of these attempts 
became law. According to paragraph 5 of the Explanatory Notes to the Racial and Religious 
Hatred Act 2006, ‘this Act takes a different approach in that it creates a new part to the 1986 
Act rather than extending the existing offence in Part 4 of the Act’. 
Paragraph 4 of the Explanatory Notes to the Act explains that: 
The new offences apply to the use of words or behaviour or display of written 
material (new section 29B), publishing or distributing written material (new section 
29C), the public performance of a play (new section 29D), distributing, showing or 
playing a recording (new section 29E), broadcasting or including a programme in a 
programme service (new section 29F) and the possession of written materials or 
recordings with a view to display, publication, distribution or inclusion in a 
programme service (new section 29G). For each offence the words, behaviour, 
written material, recordings or programmes must be threatening and intended to stir 
up religious hatred.  
This shows the three requirements for the offence: an act directed at a group; words 
behaviour, material or images which are threatening; and, an intention to stir up religious 
hatred.97 
The final version of the Act was substantially different to the one that was originally 
proposed, mainly through a number of changes made in the House of Lords. The original 
proposal would have just added the offence of stirring up religious hatred to the existing 
offence of stirring up racial hatred.98 One of the main arguments brought forward by 
supporters of the introduction of religious hatred provisions was that Jews and Sikhs were 
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covered by the prohibition of racial hatred, but Muslims, Hindus, Christians or those without 
a religion were not.99 
The first change made by the House of Lords to the proposal was that the new offence 
of incitement to religious hatred got its own legislative provision, rather than just being added 
to the existing offence of incitement to racial hatred. The reason given was that opponents of 
the Bill in both Houses of Parliament disagreed with giving religious groups the same level of 
protection as racial groups because ‘a person’s religion is a matter of personal choice and 
could therefore be subject to criticism’.100  
The wording of the offence of incitement to religious hatred was also changed. In the 
original proposal, the offence included words which were ‘abusive, insulting or threatening’, 
but ‘abusive’ and ‘insulting’ were dropped during the Bill’s passage through the House of 
Lords and now the wording needs to be ‘threatening’.101 This means that ‘the Act now 
focuses more narrowly on words, behaviour or material that import threats of violence or the 
fear of violence’.102  
Another change between the original proposal and the final enacted statute is that, in 
the final version, evidence of intention to stir up religious hatred is required and that it is not 
enough to show that the publication was likely to stir up such hatred. For the racial hatred 
offence, the publication must intent to stir up hatred or, alternatively, must be likely to do 
so.103 The Post-legislative Scrutiny of the Act reports that the Crown Prosecution Service is 
of the view ‘that it is very difficult to prove a specific intent where the action(s) or speech 
may be ambiguous, or an isolated incident’.104  
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But perhaps the most far-reaching change made by the House of Lords was the 
addition of a so-called ‘free speech clause’. As Goodall writes, ‘the most vociferous attacks 
on the Bill concerned freedom of expression’105 and the addition of this clause was a response 
to that criticism. Article 29J of the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006, under the heading 
‘Protection of freedom of expression’, reads:  
Nothing in this Part shall be read or given effect in a way which prohibits or restricts 
discussion, criticism or expressions of antipathy, dislike, ridicule, insult or abuse of 
particular religions or the beliefs or practices of their adherents, or of any other belief 
system or the beliefs or practices of its adherents, or proselytising or urging adherents 
of a different religion or belief system to cease practising their religion or belief 
system. 
Jeremy writes that Section 29J ‘expressly permits antipathy, dislike, ridicule, insult or abuse 
of a particular religion or belief system (or lack of religion or belief) and of practices of those 
who hold such beliefs’.106 In the debates in the House of Lords on the Racial and Religious 
Hatred Bill, the question was asked:  
what are the guarantees against the encroachment not only of religious thought police 
but also of self-censorship, which is perhaps the greatest expression of free 
expression in a liberal democracy? We have to face the fact that if we make it a 
criminal offence to stir up hatred against a group of people, then we create a climate 
within which people will think twice about even criticising it. In turn, people will 
surely run shy of saying anything that might stir up hatred of the ideology or religion 
itself and also develop a fear of being critical of it, satirising it or even poking the 
slightest fun at it.107 
In the same debates, Lord Lester, who drafted the freedom of expression clause, recalled that 
Rowan Atkinson108 had pointed out that the bill ‘promotes the idea that there should be a 
right not to be offended when the right to offend is far more important’.109 Lord Lester 
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pointed out that the Bill, because of its overbreadth and vagueness, threatened to chill free 
expression and, that the proposed changes introduced safeguards ‘to prevent the new offences 
from sweeping too broadly and to deal with the chilling of free expression’.110 Lord Lester 
came back to this later on where he mentioned ‘the chilling effects that such broad and vague 
offences would have on freedom of speech, discussion, debate and the free flow of opinions 
and information in whatever form’.111 So the chilling effect of the Bill on free speech was 
stressed again and again during the debates in the House of Lords. The amendments were 
approved by the House of Commons by a majority of one and thus became part of the Act. 
Lord Lester states that, because of the amendments he drafted ‘the Act strikes a sound 
balance between the interests of free speech and the need to protect religious groups from 
hatred and persecution’.112 Many authors have pointed out that the four amendments to the 
original Bill have made it very difficult to prove the requirements for the offence and thus to 
secure a conviction under the Act. Both Barendt and Hare, for example, point out that, in 
practice, it may be impossible to bring prosecutions and that the Act might have only political 
effect.113 Barendt calls the Act ‘an attempt by the Labour Government to placate the Muslim 
community, which, unlike Jews and Sikhs, is not protected by the racial hatred offence and 
which as a result felt itself treated less favourably than adherents of other religious faiths’,114 
while Hare calls the new law ‘a cynical sop to a vocal minority population who felt 
themselves to have been disproportionately the victim of recent Government initiatives on 
terrorism’.115 Sandberg also calls the law ‘little more than political posturing; a simple 
statement that religious hatred is wrong’.116 Finally, Jeremy puts this in a more positive way 
as he writes that the difficulties in proving the offence may suggest that the Act is essentially 
symbolic, but that the legislation serves an important purpose in supporting groups in society 
who are afraid for their safety and, by condemning bias, prejudice and hatred, the Act sends a 
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signal to potential offenders that such conduct will be punished severely.117 So it is the 
declaratory or symbolic value of the Act, the fact that the Act makes a statement that 
religious hatred is wrong, which appears to be its most important value. 
That the offence is indeed difficult to prosecute is confirmed by the Post-legislative 
Scrutiny which states that, if the success of the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 was to 
be judged by the number of convictions it secured, then the act ‘has not been a successful 
piece of legislation’. It reports that:  
There has been one successful conviction under the legislation, with a person 
convicted of an offence in relation to stirring up hatred against persons on religious 
grounds under Section 1 of the Act. Two other people have been arrested and 
charged with offences under the legislation, a prosecution was bought against the 
person in one case and they were acquitted of all charges at trial, and the charges 
were dropped against the person in the second case due to a technicality – however 
the investigation on this case remains ongoing.118  
So there are difficulties in proving the new offence of incitement to religious hatred and there 
have been very few (successful) prosecutions to date. But how does this offence differ from 
the offence of blasphemy? 
VI Blasphemy and incitement to religious hatred offences compared 
We have mentioned a number of issues that have been raised in relation to the offence of 
blasphemy. The first issue was that the offence was seen as discriminatory as it only covered 
the Church of England and other Christian religions. This was seen especially as a problem 
for Muslims. Sikhs and Jews were considered to be ethnic groups and thus covered by the 
protection against racial hatred, but Muslims were not. The offence of religious hatred has 
dealt with this problem as it covers all religions and also those without a religion. As was said 
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in the debates in the House of Lords, ‘this legislation recognises a more complex and diverse 
society, which respects those of faith and those of none’.119 
The second issue raised against the offence of blasphemy was that it was not clearly 
defined (as it was an offence established through case law rather than defined by statute) and 
that it was too broad and vague. It was also a strict liability offence in that it only required 
intent to publish not intent to blaspheme. Both were said to violate Article 7 of the ECHR. 
This has changed as the offence of incitement to religious hatred has been defined in law and 
requires proof of intent to stir up religious hatred.  
The third major contention against the offence of blasphemy was that it was a 
violation of the rights to freedom of religion and expression. And, although the European 
Court of Human Rights has held that the English blasphemy laws were compatible with the 
Convention, this was an issue that came back again and again in the debates and in the 
literature and even featured in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. The 
new law on incitement to religious hatred now contains a freedom of speech clause, to deal 
with this issue of compatibility. The clause protects ‘freedom of expressions on religious 
matters, including vigorous criticism or abuse of particular religions, their dogma, and 
practices’.120  
All this suggests that the offence of incitement to religious hatred would stand the test 
of compatibility with the ECHR better and that it would not be held to violate the ECHR by 
the European Court of Human Rights.  
VII Concluding remarks 
This chapter has described the law and case law on blasphemy as it existed until 2008. The 
developments leading to the abolition of blasphemy in 2008 and the debates in both Houses 
of Parliament have been analysed. Apart from the fact that it had become a ‘dead letter’ or 
dormant law because it was seldom used in the 20th century, the major objections against the 
law on blasphemy were that it only protected the Christian religion; that the definition of the 
offence was unclear and that there was no requirement of intent to blaspheme, both of which 
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made it difficult for people to know when they would break the law and this created legal 
uncertainty about a criminal law offence; and, that it was questionable whether the law was 
compatible with international human rights law, especially with Articles 7, 9, 10 and 14 of 
the ECHR. All of these issues appear to have been addressed and remedied by the Racial and 
Religious Hatred Act 2006, which created the offence on incitement to religious hatred. This 
Act and the important changes made to the original Bill by the House of Lords have been 
analysed and the conclusion was that the offence, although it deals with the issues raised 
against the laws on blasphemy and would most likely not be held to be incompatible with 
international human rights law, has created an offence which is extremely difficult to 
prosecute and might only have symbolic and political significance. 
As in other countries, the Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris in January 2015, sparked a lot 
of discussions about freedom of speech in the UK,121 but this does not appear to have led to 
calls for reintroducing the law of blasphemy. However, just days after the attack, the former 
Archbishop of Canterbury, Lord Carey, warned that Britain’s fear of criticising Islam has led 
to a self-imposed blasphemy law. He said that ‘a de facto blasphemy law is operating in 
Britain today. The fact is that publishers and newspapers live in fear of criticising Islam’.122 
He added that the Press should be encouraged to print controversial material, even if Muslims 
find it offensive. He also said that blasphemy laws were ‘unjust and outdated’.123 In 
November 2015, Labour MP Keith Vaz, speaking at a Muslim Council of Britain event on 
responses to terrorism and extremism, said that he had no problem with blasphemy laws 
being reintroduced in Britain, as long as they would apply equally to everyone. He actually 
stopped short of saying that such a law would be a good idea.124 
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It is submitted that the abolition of the blasphemy laws was a positive step and that 
the Racial and Religious Hatred Act2006 has dealt with some of the issues raised about those 
laws. However, Lord Carey does raise an important point about the fear of criticising Islam. 
This echoes the fears during the debates about both blasphemy and the Racial and Religious 
Hatred Act 2006 about the chilling effect of such laws and about stifling criticism. Sandberg 
and Doe mention that during the period in the 20th century when there were no prosecutions 
for blasphemy, it was ‘policed extra-legally; it was curtailed by the fears, anxieties and 
sensitivities of individuals rather than by law’.125 Goodall points to the fact that the Racial 
and Religious Hatred Act 2006 aims to deter.126 The Post-legislative Scrutiny points out that 
the lack of prosecutions could be due to the preventative aspect of the law, which means that 
it is conceivable that the number of offences are limited because people moderate their 
language and behaviour to avoid prosecution.127 But there is a fine line between convincing 
people to moderate their language and behaviour and restricting or stifling discussion and 
criticism of religions, their dogma, and the practices of their adherents. Opinion will always 
be divided as to where this line should be drawn. Therefore, it is submitted that restrictions on 
the freedom of expression, be it through blasphemy or incitement to religious hatred laws, 
should always be rigorously scrutinised by the domestic courts and by the European Court of 
Human Rights. 
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